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ABSTRACT
NASA and the nation are again at a point of decision concerning the future direc­ 
tion of space exploration and space exploitation. Many new initiatives have been 
proposed for future exploration and colonization of the solar system, including 
an outpost on the moon and, eventually, a permanent Martian base.
The transportation system required to implement these bold, new initiatives must 
be a powerful one—able to explore new frontiers, transport large amounts of 
cargo, and guarantee safety and reliability well into the next century. NASA must 
now decide how to implement these goals. Through ongoing NASA upgrades and evolu­ 
tion programs, the current transportation system, the Space Shuttle, can evolve 
to meet the mission requirements of the 1990s and beyond. The broad scope of 
these evolutionary studies encompasses both the Shuttle and Shuttle-derived vehi­ 
cles, such as Shuttle-C. Shuttle evolution delays the requirement for a new low- 
earth-orbit space transportation system well into the next century, when signifi­ 
cantly new mission requirements and/or the development of new enabling technology 
may justify a new system.
This paper discusses the ongoing programs sponsored by NASA and Rockwell that 
will evolve the Shuttle into the space transportation system for the future. 
These programs include NASA's Assured Shuttle Availability Program, which will 
develop and implement cost-effective Shuttle improvements, and Rockwejl's IR&D 
projects, which are targeted at avoiding Shuttle system obsolescence and improv­ 
ing Shuttle safety, operations cost, and performance margin.
BACKGROUND
In the 1960s, America put men on the moon. We achieved that significant goal 
through a series of space programs that each had a focused, single-purpose objec­ 
tive, and required a close focus of NASA's energy. The successful achievement of 
those objectives provided a yardstick against which to measure future NASA 
achievements. The rapid accomplishment of the objectives, however, left no 
residual hardware or systems to enable future achievements in space. No building 
blocks were left on which to base manned planetary exploration or a permanent 
manned presence in low earth orbit.
In the 1970s, following the lunar landings, NASA faced an. era of lower budgets 
and higher expectations* NASA had to choose between the single-shot, single- 
purpose program approach of the 1960s and a longer-term focus that would estab­ 
lish the needed infrastructure for further achievements in space. By choosing to 
establish the necessary base from which to exploit this new frontier, NASA had to 
lower its level of achievement and build a new transportation system for low 
earth orbit. Plans to build a space station were delayed ten years while the 
Space Shuttle was designed and built.
NASA is again at a point of decision concerning the future direction of space
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exploration and space exploitation. Several choices, and combinations of choices, 
are available. Space Station (SS) Freedom 9 now under development, provides the 
gateway to many of these choices. A Mission to Planet Earth program will utilize 
present and new assets in low earth orbit to better understand and utilize our 
own planet. An Outpost on the Moon program will return man to the moon to form a 
permanent colony. Exploration of the solar system will retain U.S. leadership in 
the exploration of the outer solar system, A Humans to Mars program will lead ta 
the eventual establishment of a permanent Martian base.
The Space Shuttle is the fundamental building block of our space program and is 
ready to evolve into the transportation system required to implement these bold, 
new initiatives.
No other existing system is capable of delivering large payloads to orbit or 
providing a microgravity research base. The unique capabilities of man in space 
provide a broad range of activities, such as the in-orbit repair and the return 
to earth of valuable space-based assets, as well as the assembly of the larger 
and more complex orbital facilities required by each of the new initiatives.
The Shuttle is a relatively young system that is just completing the start-up 
phase of its service life. It is now a solid, operational system. The projected 
life of operational space and aircraft systems is commonly in the 20- to 30-year 
range. The Titan launch vehicle (Figure 1) has evolved from a payload capability 
of 6,600 pounds in 1960 to a projected 40,000 pounds in 1995. The Delta launch 
vehicle has evolved similarly. The design of the Shuttle allows significant 
flexibility to evolve current capabilities to achieve extended time on-orbit and 
increased payload capability. The evolutionary possibilities of the existing 
Shuttle system assure productive access to space through the continuing 
modernization of this highly valuable asset.
Even with all of its unique capabilities, the Shuttle system is still among the
most cost-effective means of orbiting satellites and other payloads. Within the
current inventory of U.S. launch vehicles (Delta, Atlas, Titan, and Shuttle), the
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cargo transportation costs (in dollars per pound of payload) decrease from about 
$4,000 for the smaller vehicles (Delta and Atlas) to about $3,000 for the Shuttle 
(Figure 2). An evolved Shuttle-C will drive costs of low earth orbit down to 
$1,400 per pound.
Beyond a competitive cost-per-pound for cargo into orbit, the Shuttle accrues the 
benefits of manned space at little added cost. These benefits include satellite 
servicing, payload return, man-tended experiments, and international cooperation, 
in addition to the intangible benefits of national prestige, pride, a powerful 
national image of competence and leadership, and the promise of manned space 
activities in the future.
As shown in Figure 3, the cost of Shuttle evolution is much less than the 
procurement of a new-design transportation system. Our nation can upgrade the 
existing Shuttle fleet and continue to build new Shuttles (each adapted to meet 
new mission requirements) at an average yearly funding level of $0.5 billion, 
while starting new initiatives in space exploration. We can not afford to spend 
an average of $4 billion per year for a new transportation system and delay any 
new initiatives into the next century.
SHUTTLE EVOLUTION
NASA has recognized the need for Shuttle evolution and maintenance of its opera­ 
tion until at least 2020. Shuttle evolution consists of two basic elements: 
1) the augmentation of the present system (adding a heavy-lift capability such as 
Shuttle-C and increasing fleet size); and 2) system upgrades to improve safety 
and reliability, to lower recurring costs, and to increase capability.
Shuttle Augmentation
Shuttle augmentation provides increased capabilities without the high risk of a 
new space transportation system development program. Already in work are the 
advanced solid rocket motors, which will increase Shuttle reliability and payload 
capability. Under study are the liquid rocket boosters, which will also increase
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Figure 2. STS Provides Competitive Cargo Cost
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Figure 3. STS Evolution is Cost Effective
payload capability while significantly increasing the opportunities for ascent 
crew escape. Future mission requirements for the proposed lunar expedition 
necessitate augmentation of a heavy-lift capability. Shuttle-C is a logical 
evolution of the Shuttle (Figure 4) and meets these heavy-lift requirements with 
a proven reliability at an affordable cost.
Shuttle-C
Shuttle-C is a largely expendable, unmanned launch system capable of carrying 
payloads to orbit. It uses existing and modified STS systems and an in-place STS 
infrastructure (Figure 5) to reduce costs and provide the earliest heavy-lift 
capability. The only new element, which replaces the orbiter, is the Shuttle-C 
cargo element (SCE). As shown in Figure 4, the SCE can evolve to meet increasing 
heavy-lift launch vehicle requirements.
With an initial launch capability in early 1995, Shuttle-C can also be used to 
support SS Freedom logistics and resupply, and to back up the Shuttle in SS 
Freedom assembly, Shuttle-C is capable of lifting 150,000 pounds and 30 percent 
more volume capacity in an 82-foot cargo bay (as compared to the Shuttle, which 
can deliver just over 50,000 pounds in a 60-foot cargo bay). When utilized to its 
maximum extent, Shuttle-C can reduce the number of launches for Phase I deploy­ 
ment from 20 to 13, and has the potential for reducing on-orbit assembly time 
from 36 to 19 months*
Additionally, Shuttle-C will enhance unmanned space science, exploration, and 
earth observation programs. The trip time to deep space is largely defined by the 
upper-stage capability after the spacecraft is delivered to low earth orbit. The 
Centaur is an existing high-energy upper stage for heavy payloads or deep space 
missions. With a Shuttle-C/high-energy upper-stage combination, spacecraft can be 
designed with a heavier weight and larger volume. This advantage results in
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Figure 4. Shuttle-C Evolution Utilizes the Well-Understood STS Design Base
mission flexibility, longer launch windows, and reduced trip time, and provides a 
more robust solar system exploration program.
Shuttle Fleet Size
NASA has projected a required average Shuttle flight rate of 14 flights per year, 
beginning in 1992. The Shuttle fleet size required to achieve this flight rate 
must accommodate the scheduled downtime for safety inspections on major system 
elements (such as orbiters) and must include scheduled opportunities to install 
major upgrade modifications. Based on projected Shuttle processing times at the 
Kennedy Space Center (KSC), five orbiters will be required to achieve 14 Shuttle 
flights per year (Figure 6). Production of a fifth orbiter must start in 1992 to 
meet existing Shuttle flight requirements. Fleet-size margin, in addition to the 
five orbiters, must be provided to allow for unexpected contingencies (e.g., 
transatlantic abort) and unscheduled downtime (e.g., structural damage to wing or 
major tile refurbishment).
Shuttle fleet size must allow stable and confident manifesting to support the 
planned Space Station program, provide confident and cost-effective user 
planning, allow the scheduled maintenance of orbital assets (such as the Hubble 
Space Telescope), accommodate the impacts of a major expendable-launch-vehicle
failure, and meet additional national security requirements for launch support*
Additional time spent on orbit reduces the availability of Shuttles to fly 
planned missions and increases the requirement for more orbiters, Spacelab and 
SpaceHab users desire longer time on orbit; and Shuttle support to a Commercially
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Figure 6. Five Orbiters Required To Achieve 14 Flights Per Year
safety hazards. The plan also emphasizes Shuttle changes that reduce system 
operating costs in KSC ground processing, flight-to-flight analyses, and Shuttle 
production. Capability upgrades extend the Shuttle time on orbit and increase 
payload capability.
Upgrading is a very affordable approach to Shuttle evolution. The upgrade funding 
requirement of $200 million to $300 million per year is a small portion of the 
NASA budget. The payback for that small investment is a Shuttle fleet evolving to 
meet the emerging space transportation requirements of the 1990s and beyond.
Rockwell is currently under contract to NASA for a 16-day extended-duration 
orbiter (EDO), and is also examining the possibility of a 28-day EDO. Rockwell 
has also been under contract to study the feasibility of a glass cockpit upgrade. 
This upgrade will replace existing, obsolete, electromechanical flight instru­ 
ments with new liquid crystal displays (Figure 7).
Several other upgrades are being studied by Rockwell through IR&D funding (Fig­ 
ure 8). Rockwell anticipates NASA funding to study these upgrades more thoroughly 
in 1990 and to begin implementation of the upgrades in 1991.
CONCLUSION
The Space Shuttle system stands not just as an internationally recognized symbol 
of America's technological capabilities, but also as an integral component of 
man's future in space. The Shuttle is an indispensable tool in expanding 
America's frontiers. It is the free world's only manned space system and promises 
proveti service well into the next century. In a fiscal environment that requires 
constrained federal spending, we must evolve the current Shuttle fleet, complete 
the task of implementing SS Freedom, and move on to the new challenges to 
America's technological and economic leadership in space.
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